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I. INTRODUCTION
“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
1
stereotype associated with their group.” The purpose of antidiscrimination laws is to combat stereotypes that have systematically
dictated the role of women, men, and minorities in the workplace.
† Jenifer M. Ross-Amato is an attorney with Davis Graham & Stubbs, LLP in
Denver, Colorado. Previously, Ms. Ross-Amato practiced commercial litigation
and employment law at Lapp, Libra, Thomson, Stoebner & Pusch, Chartered, in
Minneapolis, and served as a law clerk for the Honorable Terri Stoneburner on
the Minnesota Court of Appeals. Ms. Ross-Amato obtained her A.B. from Vassar
College and her J.D. from the University of Colorado. The author would like to
thank the following people for their invaluable contributions to this article: the
Honorable Terri Stoneburner, David A. Harbeck, Janet Pipp, and Dan Amato.
The opinions and comments expressed in this article are not necessarily the views
of anyone other than the author.
1. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
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Minnesota’s anti-discrimination law includes a category of
employees that by their definition challenge stereotypes: “[a
person] having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity
not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or
2
femaleness.”
Julienne Goins fit into this category, but the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that despite the state’s antidiscrimination law, Goins’s employer could question and ultimately
3
determine her eligibility for her choice of restroom use.
Goins v. West Group, Inc. is a significant decision in transgender
jurisprudence, because it involves the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
first interpretation of the nation’s initial across-the-board statutory
4
prohibition of discrimination against transgender people. The
effect of this ruling is that even though employers are still
prohibited from discriminating against people on the basis that the
employee’s self-image differs from a biological stereotype of
feminine or masculine, in Minnesota an employer can prohibit
such an employee from using the restroom of their choice.
This article examines the methodology applied by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in interpreting the Minnesota Human
Rights Act (“MHRA”) in Goins and the implications of this
interpretation on transgender jurisprudence in Minnesota. Part II
outlines the facts, procedural history, and the supreme court’s
decision in Goins. Part III considers the supreme court’s approach
to interpreting the MHRA – that if not expressly considered by the
legislature, the supreme court would not interpret the MHRA to
have such broad social implications. Part IV considers the
implications of the supreme court’s determination that Goins must
prove she is eligible to use the women’s restroom based on her
“biological gender.”
Part V concludes that West Group
distinguished Goins on the basis that Goins failed to conform to
the stereotypical view of a woman using the women’s restroom and
that because this mistreatment is permitted, the tenets of the
MHRA have not been upheld.

2. M INN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 41(a) (2000).
3. Goins v. West Group, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 717, 725-26 (Minn. 2001)
[hereinafter Goins II].
4. Rosalind Bentley, The Supreme Court: Minnesotans React to Ruling with Joy,
Disappointment, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 21, 1996, at 8A; see M INN. STAT. §
363.01, subd. 41(a) (2000).
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II. GOINS V. WEST GROUP, INC.
The case of Goins involves the claim by Julienne Goins of
discrimination based on her sexual orientation, as defined by the
MHRA. An examination of the factual background and an analysis
of the procedural posture outlines the history of Goins.
A. Factual Background
At her birth in 1973, Julienne Goins was designated male and
5
given the name Justin Travis Goins. Like many transgendered
individuals, throughout her childhood and adolescence Goins was
6
confused about her sexual identity. After counseling, Goins began
taking female hormones in 1994, and has presented herself
7
publicly as female since 1995. Through a Texas court order in
October 1995, Goins changed her legal name to Julienne Hannah
Goins, and her “legal” gender from “genetic male” to “reassigned
8
female.”
In May 1997, Goins began working in the Rochester, New York
office of West Group, where she presented as female and
presumably used the women’s restroom without incident. In 1997,
Goins visited West’s Eagan facility on four occasions while
considering relocating to Minnesota, which she eventually did in
9
October 1997.
While visiting the Eagan facility Goins used the women’s
10
restroom, as she had done in New York. A small number of
female employees at the Eagan facility expressed concern to West
11
supervisors about sharing a restroom with Goins.
After
consultation with the director of human resources and legal
counsel, West decided to treat the women’s complaints as a hostile
5. Goins II, supra note 3, at 720. The sex designation on a birth certificate is
determined by the birth attendant, and if the external genitalia appear
unambiguous, the external genitalia usually determine the sex designated on the
birth certificate. Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the
Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 271 (1999). Because a birth
certificate is commonly used to obtain other legal documents, an individual’s legal
sex is generally fixed based upon the appearance of a person’s external genitalia
at birth. Id. at 272.
6. Goins II, supra note 3, at 720.
7. Id. at 720-21.
8. Id. at 721.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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work environment issue and determined that Goins would be
12
required to use either a single-occupancy, unisex restroom on a
different floor of the building where she worked, or the single13
occupancy, unisex restroom in another building.
On her first day of work at West’s Minnesota office, Goins was
informed of the complaints and the new restroom policy Goins
objected to West’s restroom policy, refused to comply, and
proposed education and training to allay the concerns of her
14
coworkers. Goins refrained from eating or drinking during the
work day to avoid having to use the women’s restroom, but at times,
15
she used the women’s restroom located closest to her workstation.
Goins complained to West’s human resources representative in
Rochester, New York, but she was referred back to the Minnesota
16
supervisors who drafted the restroom policy. Approximately one
month after Goins began work in Minnesota, West threatened to
take disciplinary action if Goins did not comply with the restroom
17
policy.
In January 1998, Goins resigned, declining an offer of
18
promotion. In her letter of resignation, Goins stated that she
resigned because of the unwelcome, stressful environment created
19
by the restroom policy.
B. The District Court
Goins brought an action in Hennepin County District Court,
alleging that West had discriminated against her based on her
sexual orientation, as defined by the MHRA, by denying her access
20
to the women’s restroom. Further, Goins alleged that West’s
discriminatory treatment, along with the conduct of its employees,
created a hostile work environment, also in violation of the

12. “Unisex” is defined as “adj. (1) Designed for or suitable to both sexes . . .
(2) Not distinguished or distinguishable on the basis of sex. n. The elimination or
absence of sexual distinctions, especially in dress.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
1822 (4th ed. 2000).
13. Goins II, supra note 3, at 721.
14. Id.
15. Goins v. West Group, Inc., 619 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
[hereinafter Goins I].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Goins II, supra note 3, at 721.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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21

MHRA.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of West
22
and dismissed Goins’s claims. In an analysis ultimately adopted by
the Minnesota Supreme Court, the district court used the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting framework for
23
proving claims of indirect discrimination. The district court
determined that the ultimate issue for its consideration was
“whether a pre-op[erative] male to female transsexual person is
legally entitled to be treated as a female for the purpose of
24
bathroom use.” The district court concluded that Goins failed to
prove the second element of her prima facie case, that she was
qualified to use the women’s restroom, because “[i]n significant
ways she is functionally different than females with respect to the
25
most common objective criteria related to bathroom use.” The
district court felt obligated to “classify” Goins according to her
biological gender:
[T]he legislature has provided no guidance on how
transgender persons are to be classified, where
classification is necessary. Whether a person should use
the male bathroom or the female bathroom is normally a
decision in which employers do not need to become
involved. However, in the case of plaintiff, a preop[erative] male to female transsexual, it’s a legitimate
26
concern both for the employer and the employees.
Similarly, the district court found that the hostile work
environment claim failed because West’s policy was reasonable and
27
did not rise to a sufficiently pervasive level of harassment.

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 723-24; Goins v. West Group, Inc., No. 98-18222 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
4th Dist. Jan. 14, 2000). The elements of a prima facie case for indirect
discrimination, as defined in McDonnell Douglas are (1) plaintiff is a member of a
protected class; (2) plaintiff is eligible for the position in question; and (3)
plaintiff was denied the position in question. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972).
24. Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).
25. Goins v. West Group, Inc., No. 98-18222 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. Jan. 14,
2000) at 10.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id. at 12.
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C. The Court of Appeals
28

The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court.
The court of appeals found the district court’s reliance on the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework unnecessary because
29
Goins had established a direct claim of discrimination.
In
reliance on the plain language of the statutory definition of sexual
orientation, the court of appeals concluded:
The statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of the
inconsistency between anatomy and self-image. West
denied Goins use of the women’s restroom in disregard of
her undisputed female self-image. The district court
agreed with West and held that, as a matter of law,
anatomy alone makes Goins a man and that her self-image
is irrelevant to the issue of restroom use. The district
court held that Goins can only use the women’s restroom
by demonstrating anatomy consistent with self-image.
The MHRA, however, does not require an employee to
eliminate an inconsistency between self-image and
anatomy; it protects the employee
from discrimination
30
based on such an inconsistency.
West argued that in attempting to comply with the public
accommodation statute, which permits discrimination based on sex
for purposes of the designation of public restrooms according to
31
sex, it legitimately discriminated against Goins based on sex. The
court of appeals rejected this argument, stating that Goins’s claims
were based on sexual orientation, not sex: “[g]iven the
unambiguous wording of the MHRA, West had failed, at this state
of the litigation, to present a non-discriminatory, legitimate
32
defense.”
The court of appeals similarly reversed the district court on the
hostile work environment claim, finding that the evidence raised at
least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the harassment
33
would give rise to a hostile work environment. Finally, the court
of appeals ruled that the district court could not compel Goins to
answer discovery relating to her genitals because facts regarding

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Goins I, supra note 15, at 431.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 428-29.
Id. at 429 (emphasis added); see M INN. STAT. § 363.02, subd. 4 (2000).
Goins I, supra note 15, at 429.
Id. at 430.
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the appearance and function of her genitalia were irrelevant to a
34
claim based on her sexual orientation, as defined by the MHRA.
D. The Supreme Court
The supreme court unanimously reversed the court of appeals
35
in an opinion authored by Justice Russell Anderson.
The supreme court focused primarily on whether Goins had
proven a prima facie case for direct discrimination and whether the
employer’s decision was actually motivated by Goins having a
protected trait, a self-image inconsistent with her biological
36
gender. The court determined that West’s motives were based
solely on sex, because Goins was denied use only of the restrooms
37
designated for women.
The parties did not dispute that an employer may properly
38
designate restrooms according to biological sex. Rather, Goins
argued that the MHRA requires employers to allow restroom use
based on self-image of gender, whereas West argued that the public
accommodation statute allowed employers to designate restroom
39
use based on biological sex. The supreme court agreed with West
in that restroom use can be designated based on “biological
gender” not because of any statutory authority but because of
“cultural preference”:
As the district court observed, where financially feasible,
the traditional and accepted practice in the employment
setting is to provide restroom facilities that reflect the
cultural preference for restroom designation based on
biological gender.
To conclude that the MHRA
contemplates restrictions on an employer’s ability to
designate restroom facilities based on biological gender
would likely restrain employer discretion in the gender
designation of workplace shower and locker room
40
facilities, a result not likely intended by the legislature.
Concerns regarding the effect of designating public-facilities
34. Id. at 431.
35. Goins II, supra note 3, at 720, 725.
36. Id. at 722 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
141 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993))).
37. Id. at 723.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also infra Part IV. (discussing the difference between sex and
gender).
40. Goins II, supra note 3, at 723.
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use by self-image rather than biological sex influenced the court’s
41
decision. The court specifically noted that workplace restrooms
are, in other respects, covered under the MHRA, and that the
MHRA does “protect her right to be provided an adequate and
42
sanitary restroom.”
The supreme court then utilized the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework to determine whether Goins had
proven a prima facie case for disparate treatment based on
43
circumstantial evidence. The court deviated from the traditional
second element requiring that the employee prove she is eligible
44
for the specific employment position in question. Instead, the
court concluded that Goins must show that (1) she is a member of
a protected class; (2) she is eligible to use the restrooms designated
for her biological gender; and (3) she was denied access to the
45
restroom, which she is qualified to use. The court found that
Goins had failed to show that she was eligible to use the restrooms
46
designated for use according to her biological gender. The court
provided no specific criteria with which to analyze whether an
employee is eligible to use a certain restroom. In a Special
Concurrence, Justice Page clarified that in order to be eligible to
use the women’s restroom, “Goins must establish that she is
47
biologically female” and that she had failed to do so. Therefore,
the court concluded, Goins failed to make her prima facie case.
Finally, the court also held that Goins failed to prove a hostile
work environment claim because West’s restroom policy was not
48
based on sexual orientation. The court noted that the conduct of
Goins’s coworkers, although inappropriate, did not rise to a level so
severe or pervasive as to create an actionable hostile work
49
environment.

41. Id.
42. Id. at 723 n.2. The court did not state, however, that transgender
employees are protected under the MHRA in all other terms, conditions, facilities,
or privileges of employment. Id.
43. Id. at 724; see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
44. Goins II, supra note 3, at 724.
45. Id. The court noted that the elements, as provided in McDonnell Douglas
Corp., “vary with the circumstances of the alleged discrimination.” Id.
46. Id. at 725.
47. Id. at 726 (Page, J., concurring specially) (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 725.
49. Id.
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III. INTERPRETING THE MINNESOTA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
Because the MHRA provides the first statewide protection of
transgender people, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the MHRA is of central importance to transgender
50
jurisprudence. Three perspectives of the court’s interpretation of
the statute are examined: (1) whether the legislature intended the
statute to have broad social implications; (2) whether the
legislature indirectly considered the rationale behind questioning a
transgender person’s use of the restroom; and (3) whether the
purpose of the statute was to allow an employer to discriminate
against a transgender person on the basis of sex.
The MHRA was amended in 1993 to include a prohibition of
discrimination against an employee in the terms, conditions,
51
facilities, or privileges of employment based on sexual orientation.
The statute’s definition of “sexual orientation” is so broad as to
52
unmistakably encompass transgender people:
“Sexual orientation” means having or being perceived as
having an emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to
another person without regard to the sex of that person
or having or being perceived as having an orientation for
such attachment, or having or being perceived as having a selfimage or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological
maleness or femaleness. “Sexual orientation” does not
include
a physical or sexual attachment to children by an
53
adult.

50. This is an important issue because other states and cities have modeled
their discrimination statutes after the MHRA. See infra note 75. One other state,
Rhode Island, has adopted a similarly broad protective statute. See R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 34-37-3(17) (1995 & Supp. 2001) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of a
person’s actual or perceived gender, as well as a person’s gender identity, genderrelated self-image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related expression;
“whether or not . . . different from that traditionally associated with the person’s
sex at birth”).
51. M INN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (2000).
52. In Minnesota, transgender people are included within the definition of
sexual orientation, but the definition of transgender is not entirely appropriate.
Transgender people are not treated differently because of their sexual preference
or affection for another. Often times the sexual preference of a transgender
person is unknown, although in such a case transgender people may be treated
differently because of a perceived sexual preference or affection. More likely,
however, transgender people are treated differently because of the inconsistency
between their self-image and their biological sex, and the statutory language seems
to indicate that.
53. M INN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 41(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
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The parties agreed that Goins has a self-image inconsistent
with her biological gender and that she is included in the protected
54
category defined by the statute as sexual orientation.
The supreme court focused on West’s intent to discriminate,
rather than Goins’s inclusion within the protected category. The
court found that West discriminated against Goins based on her sex
or gender rather than her sexual orientation: “[Because] Goins
sought and was denied access only to those restrooms designated
for women, West’s enforcement of that policy was likewise
55
grounded on gender.” Nevertheless, West was not liable because
the MHRA provides an exception to the prohibition on sex
56
discrimination for public accommodations. The MHRA has no
similar exception to the prohibition on sexual orientation
discrimination.
The supreme court clearly felt that society is not yet prepared
for and the Minnesota legislature had not anticipated a means of
57
restroom designation based on self-image.
Bearing in mind that the obligation of the judiciary in
construing legislation is to give meaning to words
accorded by common experience and understanding, to
go beyond the parameters of a legislative enactment
would amount to an intrusion upon the policy-making
function of the legislature. Accordingly, absent more express
guidance from the legislature, we conclude that an employer’s
designation of employee restroom use based on biological
gender is not sexual58 orientation discrimination in
violation of the MHRA.
Unless the legislature had expressly considered and accounted
for such implications, the court would not interpret a statute to
create a result with such broad implications.
A. Legislative Intent
The supreme court believed that the Minnesota legislature had
not considered whether to allow transgender people to use the
restroom of their choice. The adoption of the amendment to the
54. Goins II, supra note 3, at 722.
55. Id. at 723. It appears that West never suggested to Goins that she use the
men’s restroom. Id. at 725 n.5.
56. M INN. STAT. § 363.02, subd. 4 (2000).
57. Goins II, supra note 3, at 723.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
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MHRA in 1993 to include gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
people, had broad social implications for Minnesota and the
59
nation. This section examines the history behind the adoption of
the 1993 amendment to the MHRA to determine whether the
legislature was aware that the statute would have the broad social
60
implications envisioned by the supreme court.
61
The MHRA arose from the local politics of the Twin Cities.
The language contained in the MHRA was based on the language
62
of municipal ordinances in both Minneapolis and St. Paul. In
1974, Minneapolis passed an ordinance prohibiting discrimination
63
on the basis of “affectional or sexual preference.” St. Paul also
64
passed a similar ordinance in 1974.
A year later in 1975,
Minneapolis amended the definition of “affectional or sexual
preference” to include “having or projecting a self-image not
associated with one’s biological maleness or one’s biological
65
femaleness.”
At the state level in 1975, anti-discrimination bills were
introduced in both the Minnesota Senate and House of
66
67
Representatives. Both bills were defeated.
In 1978, the St. Paul ordinance protecting transgender people

59. See Donna Halvorsen, They Know Whereof They Legislate, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Apr. 2, 1993, at 1B (interviewing Senator Allan Spear and
Representative Karen Clark on the significance of the passage of the “gay-rights
bill”).
60. See PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON M INTER, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A
HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICY M AKERS (2000) [hereinafter TRANSGENDER
EQUALITY].
61. Id. at 19.
62. See Sen. Allan Spear, Minnesota Senate Floor Debate on Senate File 444
(Mar. 18, 1993).
63. See M INNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDINANCE 99-68 (1974) (amending
M INNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 945 (relating to Civil Rights).
64. See ST. PAUL, MINN., ORDINANCE 15,653, ¶ J, (1974) (amending ST. PAUL,
M INN., LEGISLATIVE CODE § 74.02).
65. See M INNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDINANCE 100-288 (1975); see also M INNEAPOLIS,
M INN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 139.20 (1975) (defining affectional preference).
66. See S.F. 595, 69th Minn. Leg., Feb. 24, 1975; see H.F. 536, 69th Minn. Leg.,
Feb. 20, 1975. The public accommodation section of the bill was dropped in the
House Judiciary Committee. DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR
GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A GAY RIGHTS M OVEMENT IN AMERICA 237 (1999).
67. Senate File 595 never left the Senate Judiciary Committee to which it was
sent on May 19, 1975; House File 536 was defeated, as amended, after a floor
debate on May 8, 1975. Minnesota State House Representative Arne Carlson
offered an amendment on the House floor that included protection of gender
identity in the bill. CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 66, at 237.
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68

against discrimination was repealed. In 1990, however, the St.
Paul City Council re-enacted the law, with an expansive definition
of “sexual or affectional orientation” that included “having or
being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally
associated with one’s biological maleness or one’s biological
69
femaleness.”
A year later, an initiative to repeal the
70
discrimination ordinance reached the ballot again. During the
campaign against the repeal of the St. Paul ordinance, a
transgender activist refuted opponents’ arguments about
transgender people in public restroom by stating that Minneapolis
71
has not experienced any problems in public restrooms since 1975.
In 1991, St. Paul voters defeated the proposed repeal of the anti72
discrimination ordinance.
After their victory in St. Paul, activists pushed for statewide
discrimination protection for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
73
transgender people. Although the gay, lesbian, and bisexual
community was unsure about whether including transgender
language would mean the death-knell of the bill, several key
transgender activists threatened to take political action against the
74
community if the language was not included. The bill’s legislative
sponsors and the activists lobbying for the proposed legislation
made an affirmative choice to include protections for transgender
75
people in the amendments.
68. See ST. PAUL, MINN., ORDINANCE 16,436 (1978).
69. See ST. PAUL, MINN., ORDINANCE 17,744, § 3 (1990) (amending ST. PAUL,
M INN., LEGISLATIVE CODE § 183.02); see also ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGISLATIVE CODE §
183.02 (26).
70. TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 60, at 21.
71. See id. (quoting authors’ interview with Susan Kimberly on June 25, 1999).
72. Anthony Lonetree, Voters Refuse To Repeal Gay Rights, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Nov. 6, 1991, at 1A.
73. TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 60, at 22.
74. Id. at 22 (quoting authors’ interview with Susan Kimberly on June 25,
1999).
75. Although creating a wholly new category of protection for transgender
people has obvious benefits, such as visibility and symbolic value. Pragmatically,
legislators are more prone to amending an existing protection. Paisley Currah &
Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle To Achieve Judicial and
Legislative Equality For Transgender People, 7 W & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 50 (2000).
In San Francisco, the local human rights ordinance includes “gender identity” as a
protected category, and sixteen other local ordinances have similar separate
categories. S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE 433-94 (Dec. 30, 1994); see also ANN ARBOR,
M ICH., ORDINANCE 10-99 (Mar. 17, 1999); ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCE No. 00-1983
(Dec. 4, 2000); BENTON COUNTY, OR., ORDINANCE 98-0139 (Aug. 14, 1998);
BOULDER, COLO., ORDINANCE 7040 (Jan. 20, 2000); IOWA CITY, IOWA, ORDINANCE
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Although the issue was key to activists, the inclusion of
transgender protection was never raised in the legislative debates:
“We made no effort to hide it but we weren’t going to discuss it
76
unless people brought it up.” No out-transgender people testified
77
at the hearings. An amendment to the definition of sexual
orientation was suggested: “homosexual, heterosexual, or bisexual,”
78
and such an amendment clearly excluded transgender people.
The amendment was defeated on the Senate floor, where Senator
Spear argued that his proposed language refrained from
categorizing people, whereas the amendment did, and the case law
from Minneapolis and St. Paul, with nearly identical language,
provided a clear precedent for future interpretations of the
79
statute. The bill passed and Governor Arne Carlson signed it into
80
law.
The legislature never indicated that it anticipated the issue of
restroom use by transgender people, and the prohibition against
transgender discrimination seems to have passed largely under the
81
radar screen of its potential critics. On the other hand, the
adoption of the 1993 amendment was a major change in the state’s
anti-discrimination laws, requiring a significant political movement
of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender activists to lobby for its
adoption. The result of that movement is a statute with plain
language that speaks for itself, unambiguously including
transgender people within the definition of sexual orientation and
exempting the segregation of public restrooms on the basis of sex
95-3697 (Nov. 7, 1995); ITHACA, N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 2-2000, ch. 215, art. V, § 21530 (2000); JEFFERSON COUNTY, KY., ORDINANCE 36 (Oct. 12, 1999); LEXINGTONFAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, KY., ORDINANCE 201-99 (July 8, 1999);
LOUISVILLE, KY., ORDINANCE 9 (Jan. 26, 1999); M ADISON, WIS., EQUAL
OPPORTUNITIES ORDINANCE (Aug. 1, 2000); NEW ORLEANS, LA., ORDINANCE 18794
(July 8, 1998); OLYMPIA, WASH., ORDINANCE 5670 (Feb. 25, 1997); PORTLAND, OR.,
CIVIL RIGHTS ch. 23.01 (2000); SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE § 14.04.030 (1999);
TUCSON, ARIZ., ORDINANCE 9199 (Feb. 1, 1999); WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL.,
ORDINANCE 98-520 (July 20, 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 1458 (2000).
76. TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 60, at 22 (quoting authors’ interview
with Minnesota State Senator Allan Spear on June 23, 1999).
77. See Hearing on S.F. 444 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 78th Minn. Leg.
(Mar. 5, 1993); Hearing on H.F. 595 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 78th Minn.
Leg. (Mar. 8, 1993); see also TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 60, at 22.
78. TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 60, at 22.
79. Id. (quoting authors’ interview with Minnesota State Senator Allan Spear
on June 23, 1999).
80. Halvorsen, supra note 59, at 1B.
81. Id. at 5B. Yet one of the bill’s sponsors, Representative Karen Clark spoke
of the campaign, “It’s Time” as including the transgender community. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 6
FINAL ROSS -AMATO GOINS.DOC

582

10/28/2002 10:56 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:2

82

but not on the basis of sexual orientation. The adoption of the
plain language of the statute was a broad social change simply in
itself. Therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court could have just as
likely deferred to the plain language of the MHRA and concluded
that the legislature was aware that in adopting the broad
protections against discrimination for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender people was itself a statement for social change.
B. The Rationale Behind the Fear
Although the Minnesota legislature did not expressly consider
the implications of a transgender person using a multi-use
restroom, the legislature considered the same rationale behind the
policy of keeping transgender people from using the restroom of
their choice. The legislature considered opponents’ fears that the
legislation would encourage and allow sexual misconduct; these
fears are similar to those of employees who complain about sharing
a restroom with a transgender coworker, forcing an employer to
balance the interests of the other employees against that of the
transgender employee. This section examines whether the
legislature indirectly considered the implications of a transgender
person using a multi-use restroom, in particular by addressing fears
of sexual misconduct in general.
Many employees express their discomfort in sharing a
83
restroom with a transgender person as fear. This fear likely stems
from stereotypes linking transgender people with sexual
84
predators. When the Minnesota legislature considered the 1993

82. See M INN. STAT. § 363.02, subd. 41(a) (2000).
83. Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and
Judicial Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 369 (1999).
84. Id. People complaining about sharing a restroom with a transgender
person may also express their fear as a loss of privacy, but multi-user restrooms are
not a place where employees have a heightened expectation of privacy beyond the
protections that the law currently provides. Id. at 370. But see Lake v. Wal-Mart,
Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998) (finding Minnesota recognizes invasion of
privacy claims for intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation, and publication of
private facts); Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 2000 WL
1121530, at *3 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating tort of intrusion upon seclusion has three
elements: (1) intrusion, (2) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person (3) into
a matter in which the person has a legitimate expectation of privacy). It seems,
however, that if there were no misconduct within the restroom, there would be no
intrusion that is highly offensive to a reasonable person. No cases seem to hold
that simply by entering a gender-segregated restroom a person has a legitimate
expectation of privacy.
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amendment to the MHRA, critics voiced fears that a law
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would
85
sanction the actions of sexual predators. To dissuade those fears,
the legislature adopted an amendment to the definition of “sexual
orientation” excluding “a physical or sexual attachment to children
86
by an adult.” By adopting such an amendment, the legislature
expressly recognized that sexual misconduct is excluded from the
definition of “sexual orientation” and was never intended to be
87
sanctioned by the legislature.
The Eighth Circuit has recently confirmed the legislature’s
determination about sexual misconduct, finding that without some
specific allegation of misconduct, an employee has no claim that a
hostile work environment is created when an employee shares a
88
restroom with a transgender coworker. In Cruzan v. Special School
District No. 1, the plaintiff did not allege that the transgender
coworker with whom she had shared a restroom had “engaged in
any inappropriate conduct other than merely being present in the
89
women’s faculty restroom.” Without an allegation of misconduct,
the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff did not have a claim for a
90
hostile work environment against her employer. Similarly at West,
no employee ever alleged that Goins had acted inappropriately in
91
the restroom.
85. See Hearing on S.F. 444, supra note 77; Hearing on H.F. 595, supra note
77; Sen. Allan Spear, supra note 62.
86. See Sen. Allan Spear, supra note 62; see also M INN. STAT. § 363.01, subd.
41(a) (2000).
87. See Sen. Allan Spear, supra note 62.
88. Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 01-3417, 2002 WL 1339108, at *2
(8th Cir. June 20, 2002); see also Cruzan v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch. Sys., 165 F.
Supp. 2d 964, 968 (D. Minn. 2001). The U.S. District Court noted that the
complainant could use a unisex restroom, if she chose not to share a restroom
with the transgender employee. Id. The court distinguished that case from Goins
in that the complainant in Cruzan could choose whether she wanted to use the
unisex restroom, whereas Goins did not have a similar choice. Id. at 969 n.2. The
Minnesota Supreme Court referenced a related case, Cruzan v. Special School District
No. 1, decided by the Department of Human Rights. See Goins II, supra note 3, at
717, 723 (citing Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 31706 (Dep’t of Human
Rights. Aug. 26, 1999)). See also Rosalind Bentley, Transgenderism Has Become a
Workplace Issue For Employers, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 11, 1998, at 1D
(discussing how employers confront issues relating to an employee undergoing a
gender transition).
89. Cruzan, 2002 WL 1339108, at *2; see also Cruzan, No. 31706 at ¶3a; Goins I,
supra note 15, at 428 n.3.
90. Cruzan, 2002 WL 1339108, at *2.
91. Goins I, supra note 15, at 428 n.3.
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As in the case of West, employers and courts have denied
transgender employees use of the restroom by falling back on the
seemingly insurmountable practical problems of placating fearful
92
employees. This argument no longer carries any weight. Without
some allegation of misconduct, employers need not balance
unfounded fears of coworkers against the interest of the
93
transgender employee in using the restroom of their choice.
Therefore, by making an affirmative statement that the MHRA
will not sanction sexual misconduct by anyone protected under the
sexual orientation amendment, the Minnesota legislature indicated
that even if it had not considered the issue of transgender restroom
use specifically, it had, at least, considered the rationale behind
prohibiting transgender employees from sharing a restroom with
their coworkers.
C. Sex Discrimination vs. Sexual Orientation Discrimination
In interpreting the MHRA, the supreme court held that West
had discriminated against Goins on the basis of her “biological”
94
gender rather than her “sexual orientation.”
The logical
conclusion of this finding would be that but for the public
accommodation exception for sex discrimination, Goins would be
protected under the prohibition against sex discrimination.
However, that is not the case.
This section analyzes the inappropriate nature of the supreme
court’s interpretation that West discriminated against Goins on the
basis of her sex. First, Goins would likely not be protected in any
95
other context under the statute prohibiting sex discrimination.
92. See Keller, supra note 83, at 368; see also Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc.,
667 F.2d 748, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1982) (describing transgender’s use of women’s
restroom led to disruption); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659,
661 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing employer affidavit that transgender’s use of men’s
restroom caused “personnel problems”); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850
F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting employer forbade transgender plaintiff
from using women’s restroom).
93. Cruzan, 2002 WL 1339108, at *2.
94. Goins II, supra note 3, at 723.
95. See Currah & Minter, supra note 75, at 37; see generally Richard Green,
Spelling “Relief” For Transsexuals: Employment Discrimination and the Criteria of Sex, 9
YALE L. & POL’ Y REV. 125 (1985). Transgender litigants have largely been
unsuccessful in arguing that they are protected under the prohibitions against
sexual orientation discrimination. Id.; see Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque
Body in the “Nascent Jurisprudence of Transsexualism,” 4 M ICH. J. GENDER & L. 275,
311-12 (1997).
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Second, the supreme court’s interpretation would render
unnecessary the statutory language under the definition of “sexual
96
orientation.”
Transgender plaintiffs have argued that if sex and gender are
synonymous, Title VII’s discrimination prohibitions should protect
transgender people. However, courts have nearly unanimously
determined that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination is
97
specific to “sex” and does not include transgender. The most
98
famous of these cases is Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. In Ulane, the
plaintiff, Karen Ulane, previously a male pilot for eleven years,
underwent female hormone treatment, and then took a leave of
99
absence to undergo sex reassignment surgery. Upon her return
to work as a woman, Eastern Airlines refused to reemploy Ulane as
100
a pilot. As in Goins, the Seventh Circuit focused on the intent of
the employer, but in Ulane, the Seventh Circuit found that Eastern
Airlines had not discriminated against Ulane based on her sex, but
rather, based on her sexual identity or her status as a transgender
101
person.
In Ulane, as in Goins, the court relied on legislative intent:
“[O]ur responsibility is to interpret this congressional legislation
and determine what Congress intended when it decided to out-law
102
discrimination based on sex.” The category of sex was added as a
floor amendment to Title VII; as in the case of Minnesota with
103
transgender, sex was not the focal point of congressional debates.
The Seventh Circuit concluded: “[T]he dearth of legislative
history . . . strongly reinforces the view that the section means
104
nothing more than its plain language implies.” As in Goins, the
court construed the lack of legislative history against the
complainant and, consequentially, avoided a broad interpretation
96. See Baker v. Ploetz, 616 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Minn. 2000) (“A statute should
be interpreted, whenever possible, to give effect to all of its provisions, and ‘no
word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”)
(citation omitted).
97. See Storrow, supra note 95, at 317 (discussing “‘misprision’ of the relation
between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’”); see also infra Part IV.A. (discussing difference
between sex and gender).
98. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
99. Id. at 1082-83.
100. Id. at 1082.
101. Id. at 1087.
102. Id. at 1084.
103. Id. at 1085.
104. Id.
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of the statute: “For us to now hold that Title VII protects
transsexuals would take us out of the realm of interpreting and
105
reviewing and into the realm of legislating.”
Courts also have dismissed Title VII sex discrimination suits by
106
transgender employees for a variety of other reasons.
For
example, courts have upheld dismissals of employees for violation
107
of dress codes. Courts have denied Title VII claims on the basis
that the discrimination was not based on sex but rather the
108
employee’s change of sex.
Federal courts applying state antidiscrimination statutes have applied similar reasoning and reached
109
similar conclusions.
Recently, however, courts in New Jersey and New York have
applied state or local laws to conclude that prohibitions against sex
110
discrimination encompass transgender people.
In Enriquez v.
West Jersey Health System, a New Jersey court held that a male-tofemale transgender physician, terminated from her position as
medical director, had a claim based on the state statute prohibiting
111
discrimination on the basis of sexual identity or gender.
The
New Jersey court relied on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in which the
U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VII barred discrimination of a
woman who failed to “act like a woman” or to conform to socially-

105. Id. at 1086 (citing Gunnison v. Commissioner, 461 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir.
1972)); see also Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.
1982)(“legislative history does not show any intention to include transsexualism in
Title VII”).
106. See, e.g., Broadus v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1585257, at *5 (W.D.
Mo. 2000) (finding that supervisor’s conduct of disapproving looks or glances and
refusing to look the transgender employee in the eye did not rise to the level of
adverse employment action or a hostile work environment).
107. See Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 636 F.2d 1047, 1047 (5th Cir.
1981); Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 538 (Wash. 1993); Doyle v. Buffalo
Sidewalk Café Inc., 333 N.Y.S.2d 534, 537 (1972).
A dismissal for
“misrepresentation” during a job interview was also upheld. Sommers, 667 F.2d at
748.
108. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977);
Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
aff’d mem., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978).
109. See, e.g, James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 478, 481 n.4
(D.Kan. 1995); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98
(D.D.C. 1994).
110. See Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 380 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001); Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395-96 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1995).
111. Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 367, 373; see also N.J. STAT. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-49 (1993
& Supp. 2002).
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112

constructed gender expectations.
The New Jersey court
interpreted Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins to mean that the U.S.
Supreme Court had determined that the word “sex” in Title VII
encompasses both concepts of sex and gender and is “intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
113
women resulting from sex stereotypes.”
Similarly, in Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., a New York court
interpreted a New York City ordinance to prohibit a hostile work
environment created by derogatory comments regarding an
114
employee’s sex reassignment operation.
Applying similar
reasoning as the New Jersey court, the New York court determined
that the employer was liable for discrimination on the basis of
115
sex.
Despite these two cases, courts have overwhelmingly
concluded that transgender people are not protected by sex
116
discrimination statutes.
Therefore, Goins faces a “catch 22.”
West may properly discriminate against Goins for the purpose of
designating restroom use based on her sex, but she is likely not
protected against further discrimination on the basis of sex.
Furthermore, if Goins were protected by the prohibition
against sex discrimination, then the transgender language, “having
or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not
112. Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 371-72; see generally Taylor Flynn, Transforming The
Debate: Why We Need To Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual
Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392 (2001) (discussing the importance of
transgender litigation to challenge discrimination based on the failure to conform
to conventional gender norms, whether experienced by women or sexual
minorities).
113. Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 372 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 251 (1989)); see also Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir.
2000) (finding that under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691
(1994), discrimination against a man because he was wearing a dress constituted
sex discrimination).
114. Maffei, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 548, 555-56.
115. Id. at 556.
116. See generally Green, supra note 95, at 132-36; Kristine W. Holt, Comment,
Reevaluating Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection, and the Evolution of Transgender
Jurisprudence, 70 TEMPLE L. REV. 283 (1997); see also Storrow, supra note 95, at 310
(stating “no mater how a transsexual frames her discrimination claim, it will fail”).
Storrow argues that even though courts assert that transgender claimants may
assert discrimination claims based on sex, their claims fail because courts exclude
all claims except those alleging discrimination on the basis of what sex the
transgender complainant is perceived by others to be, or was known by others to
be in the past and transgender litigants are unlikely to sue for discrimination
based on a sex they do not believe they are. Id. at 314-15.
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traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or
117
femaleness,” would be rendered meaningless. If the supreme
court has found that an employer can treat a transgender employee
differently according to her biological sex for purposes of the use
of public accommodations only, it is unclear where the MHRA has
provided for such a distinction. The line between when an
employer is treating a transgender employee according to sex and
when an employer is treating a transgender employee according to
her self-image or identity has yet to be defined by any court.
By using the lack of legislative history as a rationale for
narrowly interpreting the MHRA, the supreme court has created an
absurd outcome. West discriminated against Goins because of her
sex for purposes of determining her restroom use, but for any
other purpose it is unclear whether the supreme court will find that
West discriminated against her on the basis of her sex or her sexual
orientation. If the court were to determine that an employer
discriminates against a transgender employee for any purpose on
the basis of her sex, then that determination would go against most
jurisprudence and would render the sexual orientation provision
unnecessary, as it relates to transgender people. Therefore, the
supreme court’s interpretation of the MHRA that an employer
directs an employee’s restroom use based on sex seems to
contradict the intent of the statute.
By examining the MHRA from these three perspectives, it is
likely that the Minnesota legislature had considered the broad
implications of the statute and intended the plain language of the
statute to protect a person such as Goins, even in the context of
restroom use.
IV. DEFINING SEX
Having determined that Goins had not made a case for direct
discrimination, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that
Goins also had not proven a prima facie case of indirect
discrimination using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework. The court found that Goins failed to show that she is
“eligible to use the restrooms designated for her biological
118
gender.”
The supreme court gave no indication as to what

117.
118.

See supra note 96.
Goins II, supra note 3, 725.
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119

“biological gender” may mean. The supreme court will need to
further clarify the qualifications necessary for eligibility to use a
certain restroom. In anticipation of this litigation, this section first
discusses the meaning of the term “gender,” as applied to
transgender, and second, discusses the meaning of the terms
biology and sex, as applied to sex reassignment surgery, for
purposes of determining eligibility for restroom designation.
A. [Trans]Gender
The supreme court used the term “biological gender.” The
combination of biology and gender is unusual; biology generally
120
has no impact on the common usage of gender. Gender refers to
“the cultural or attitudinal qualities that are characteristic of a
121
particular sex.”
The term, “sex,” on the other hand, reflects
122
biology. Gender, unlike sex, is often a matter of degree. The
notion of transgender challenges the assumption that sex or
gender consists of only two categories.
The term “transgender” is an umbrella term for different types
123
of people who are in some way gender-nonconformist.
The
broadest definition is perhaps akin to the MHRA: “people who
experience a separation between their gender and their biological
124
[or] anatomical sex.”
125
Not all transgender people define themselves similarly. The
transgender community includes people who understand
themselves to be of the opposite sex from which their genitals
would suggest and seek to become physically, socially, and legally

119. But see id. at 726 (Page, J., concurring specially).
120. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 271. “Biology” is discussed infra at Part IV.B.
121. Id. at 274 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“The word ‘gender’ has acquired the new and useful connotation
of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics)
distinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and
masculine is to male.”).
122. Id. at 271.
123. See Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex
Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN’ S L.J. 219, 239 (1998); see also Flynn, supra note 112, at
392 (defining “transgender” as an umbrella term that includes gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals whose appearance, behavior or other characteristics differ from
traditional gender norms).
124. Coombs, supra note 123, at 237; c.f. M INN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 41(a)
(2000) (protecting those “having or being perceived as having a self-image or
identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness”).
125. Coombs, supra note 123, at 237-38.
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126

the sex they have always been psychologically.
The medical
profession has defined this condition as “gender identity disorder,”
having two essential components:
(1) a strong and persistent cross-gender identification,
which is the desire to be, or the insistence that one is,
of the other sex; and
(2) persistent discomfort about one’s assigned sex or a
sense
of inappropriateness in the gender role of that
127
sex.
Nevertheless, many transgender people do not see their identity as
a “disorder.”
Some transgender people seek to have sex reassignment
surgery, but many cannot afford the surgery. Others determine
that the surgery is not necessary to live as a person with the sex to
128
which they identify.
Some, but not all, claim transgender as a
basis for an identity and a political community, while others seek to
live simply as the sex with which they are psychologically
129
identified.
The transgender community also includes cross-dressers or
non-transsexuals, who wear clothes associated with the other sex
130
but still identify with their assigned sex.
Furthermore,
transgender people vary on the issue of sexual orientation; not all
131
transgender people are homosexual.
Statutes tend to classify people into two categories – male or
132
female. The language of the MHRA, however, is not categorical
126.
127.

Id. at 238.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’ N., DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL M ANUAL OF M ENTAL
DISORDERS 576 (4th ed. 2000). Gender Identity Disorder can be distinguished
from Transvestic Fetishism, which occurs in heterosexual or bisexual males for
whom cross-dressing behavior is for the purpose of sexual excitement. Id. at 580.
Gender Identity Disorder Not Otherwise Specified includes individuals who have a
gender identity problem concurrent with a congenital intersex condition (e.g.,
partial androgen insensitivity syndrome or congenital adrenal hyperplasia). Id. at
580-81.
128. Coombs, supra note 123, at 238, 240.
129. Id. at 238.
130. Id. at 239.
131. Id. at 241-42. Society commonly confuses transgender people as
homosexual, when in fact, many transgender people are not. See, e.g., Enriquez v.
W. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 371 (N.Y. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (noting
transgender plaintiff not a homosexual or bisexual or perceived to be either and
presented no evidence she was discriminated against because of her “affectional,
emotional or physical attraction” to others).
132. See Patricia A. Cain, Stories From the Gender Garden: Transsexuals and Anti-
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133

but descriptive.
Such a methodology is well tailored to the
notion of transgender, which defies categories. To require a
transgender employee to fit into one of two categories – male or
female – along the lines of biology is inconsistent with the notion of
transgender.
B. Biological Sex and Surgery
The supreme court implied that if Goins had undergone sex
reassignment surgery, the court would have considered her
qualified to use the women’s restroom. This section examines the
impact of sex reassignment surgery on the factors used by courts to
determine biological sex.
The supreme court may have given some clue as to the
eligibility requirements for restroom use in its definition of
134
“transgender.”
The supreme court defined transgender as
“people [who] seek to live as a gender other than that attributed to
135
them at birth but without surgery.” If Goins identifies herself as
“transgender” and she is ineligible to use the women’s restroom,
then the court implies that if Goins had elected sex reassignment
surgery, then she would qualify to use the women’s restroom.
Given the information that exists regarding transgender people,
however, sex reassignment surgery is an unduly artificial line
136
between the sexes.
Discrimination Law, 75 DEN. U. L. REV. 1321, 1322-23 (1998) (“It seems, then, that
in American law and society, sex is either male or female. Gender is either
masculine or feminine. Furthermore, masculine gender is expected to correlate
to male sex, feminine gender to female sex. Persons who do not fit these
categories are unprotected . . .”); see generally THIRD SEX , THIRD GENDER: BEYOND
SEXUAL DIMORPHISM IN CULTURE AND HISTORY (Gilbert Herdt ed. 1996).
133. See Sen. Allan Spear, supra note 62.
134. Goins identified herself as transgender or trans-identified. See Goins II,
supra note 3, 721.
135. Id. at 721 n.1 (citing Keller, supra note 83, at 332).
136. See Doe v. City of Minneapolis, No. Ct. File No. EM 99-0000299, 11 (Minn.
D. Ct. 2002). The court evaluated the Supreme Court’s discussion of “biological
gender”:
[t]his cannot be all the Supreme Court had in mind, however,
in ruling that restroom designations based on biological
gender. . . . This court must assume the Supreme Court had a
broader concept of biological gender in mind, presumably one
taking into account not just reproductive organs but overall
appearance, which is what affects the comfort level of others
using the restroom.
Id.
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An individual’s “biological sex” can be determined using a
number of different criteria: chromosomes, gonads, hormonal
137
levels, genital appearance, and internal reproductive structures.
Sex reassignment surgery cannot alter every criteria used to
determine biological sex. Surgery will alter genital appearance but
it will not alter chromosomes, gonads, or internal reproductive
138
structure. A person also can undergo partial surgery to remove
or enhance outward indicators of biological sex, like a mastectomy
or breast enlargement so that the result is that genital appearance
is not wholly indicative of just one biological sex. Furthermore,
hormonal treatment alters hormone levels and dramatically alters
outward characteristics, such as hair, voice, and the distribution of
139
body fat, without surgery. These medical steps, although not a
complete sex reassignment surgery, may alter a person’s public
anatomical appearance more than sex reassignment surgery, which
140
affects only genitals, which are largely hidden to the public.
These complications in defining “biological sex” are not new
to courts, which for decades have struggled to define biological sex
141
in several areas of the law: the segregation of the sexes in prisons,
142
the prohibition of same-sex marriages, the creation of legal
143
documents, and the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
144
sex.
137. Green, supra note 95, at 126.
138. See Coombs, supra note 123, at 246 (discussing importance of procreation
in a marriage); Cain, supra note 132, at 1356 (stating that if “physical appearance
of genitalia were to define femaleness, then a post-op [male-to-female] transsexual
would typically qualify as female,” even though that person cannot reproduce).
139. See Goins’s Petition for Rehearing, at 1-2 (stating Goins “has undergone the
very serious medical process of hormonal sex-reassignment and related
procedures” which have altered her estrogen levels and her “secondary sex
characteristics” such as breasts, body fat distribution and an absence of facial hair);
see also Joshua F. Boverman & Anna C. Loomis, Cross-Sex Hormone Treatment In
Transsexualism, 7 PRIMARY PSYCHIATRY 68 (June 2000) (describing effects of female
hormones).
140. See supra note 139.
141. See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202-06 (9th Cir. 2000).
142. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (1971); In re
Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio. 1987); M INN. STAT. § 517.03, subd. 1(a)(4), (b)
(2000) (prohibiting marriages between persons of the same sex); cf. M.T. v. J.T.,
355 A.2d 204, 205-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (allowing marriage where
the transsexual was physically and psychologically a woman by successful sex
reassignment surgery).
143. See Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000).
144. Keller, supra note 83, at 340 (quoting SUZANNE KESSLER & WENDY
M CKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 121 (1978)).
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Traditionally, courts have used birth certificates and other
legal documents that are created using an individual’s birth
145
certificate to determine legal sex. An individual’s sex on their
birth certificate is generally determined by the appearance of
146
external genitalia at birth.
The problem with relying on the
appearance of genitals to determine biological sex, or gender, is
that after birth, society almost never evaluates a person’s sex based
on the appearance of genitals because external genitalia are almost
147
never publicly visible.
Beyond the birth certificate, chromosomes also can be used to
148
determine biological sex. Maria Patiño, a Spanish hurdler, failed
a sex chromatin test and was banned from the 1985 World
University Games even though she never knew she was anything
149
other than female. Even more than the appearance of genitalia,
a chromosome identification of biological sex is an impossible basis
for an employer’s evaluation of restroom use.
Courts often define sex by the purpose for which sex is being
150
defined. For example, in determining whether an illegal samesex marriage exists, courts have traditionally used the ability to
151
procreate as a criteria for sex. The problem with relying on the
ability to procreate is that in issuing marriage licenses, states do not
152
require proof of a capacity to procreate.
Furthermore,
145. See generally, In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio 1987); see also
Storrow, supra note 95, at 325-332 (discussing ability to change name and gender
on birth certificate); Greenberg, supra note 5, at 309-17 (discussing official
documents of sex).
146. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 271; see also Alice Domurat Dreger, “Ambiguous
Sex” – or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues in the Treatment of Intersexuality, 28
HASTINGS CTR. 7REP. 24, 27-28 (1998).
147. See generally Greenberg, supra note 5, at 272-73. Furthermore, in some
cases, the appearance of genitals at birth is not consistent with other biological
facts of sex. Id.
148. See id. at 273; Albert de la Chapelle, The Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin
Screening for ‘Gender Identification’ of Female Athletes, 256 JAMA 1920, 1920-23 (1986).
149. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 273; Alison Carlson, When is a Woman Not a
Woman, WOMEN’ S SPORTS AND FITNESS, Mar. 1991, at 24-29.
150. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 273.
151. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500-01 (1971);
Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33 (P.D.A. 1970); see also In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d
828, 832 (Ohio 1987). But see M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 208-210 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1976) (finding most important criterion for classifying a person as male or female
was core gender identity but assumes that heterosexual intercourse is the defining
marital act). Transsexual marriage cases show that a person cannot marry as a
member of his or her new sex before completing sex reassignment surgery.
Coombs, supra note 123, at 256.
152. See M INN. STAT. § 517.02 (2000) (discussing persons capable of
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procreation does not require marriage, procreation no longer
requires intercourse, and parenting does not require
153
procreation.
Similarly in this case, the purpose for which sex is defined does
not match the method by which the supreme court has categorized
restrooms. The purpose for which sex or gender is defined in the
designation of restrooms is to provide comfort and privacy for
people using the restrooms. By making sex reassignment surgery a
criteria for the eligibility of restroom use, the supreme court’s
154
methodology for determining sex is the appearance of genitals.
The problem with this methodology is twofold. First, an employer’s
inquiry into the appearance or functionality of an employee’s
genitals is generally not a permissible discourse between employer
and employee and could lead to a harassment claim, a privacy
155
claim, or perhaps other legal claims. Second, fellow employees’
discomfort does not stem from the outward appearance of genitals
because most fellow employees never see others’ genitals while
156
using the restroom. For these reasons, a genital-standard is both
157
contradictory and impractical.
The struggle of courts to define sex using biological factors
illustrates that biology does not provide a bright-line standard for
the eligibility for restroom use, and the application of sex
reassignment surgery as a factor simply causes further confusion.
Practically, admittance into multi-use restrooms is determined on
the basis of outward appearance and self-selection, criteria not used
to determine biological sex.
In conclusion, classification of restrooms according to biology
or sex is an unsupportable standard for restroom designation.
These categories are too restrictive and impractical. In contrast,
the MHRA is not categorical but descriptive. Self-selection of
restroom use, based on outward appearance and comfort level, is
contracting for marriage).
153. Coombs, supra note 123, at 246.
154. See Goins II, supra note 3, at 725.
155. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998)
(recognizing invasion of privacy claim).
156. See supra Part III.B.
157. See Doe v. City of Minneapolis, Ct. File No. EM 99-000029, 11 (Minn. D.
Ct. 2002) (recognizing that the Minnesota Supreme Court, in finding that
employers may designate restrooms according to “biological gender,” has “a
broader concept of biological gender in mind, presumably one taking into
account not just reproductive organs but overall appearance, which is what affects
the comfort level of others using the restroom”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/6

26

Ross-Amato: Transgender Employees & Restroom Designation—Goins v. West Group,
FINAL ROSS -AMATO GOINS.DOC

10/28/2002 10:56 PM

2002] TRANSGENDER EMPLOYEES & RESTROOM DESIGNATION

595

the only workable standard for restroom designation. Of course,
had the court applied the self-selection standard, it would have
found Goins eligible to use the women’s restroom. Therefore,
whatever criteria the supreme court used to find Goins ineligible to
use the women’s restroom, it is contradictory to the descriptive
nature of the MHRA.
V. CONCLUSION
“[B]athroom use frequently becomes either a means or a
158
source of employer discipline of [transgender] employees.”
Although restroom choice may seem like a trivial exception to the
broader protections remaining for transgender people under the
MHRA, discrimination in restroom use is of primary concern to
159
transgender employees.
When confronted with what West saw as conflicting employee
interests, and perhaps liability exposure from both sides, West
found a solution that seemed reasonable for all parties involved –
allowing Goins to use a third restroom labeled “unisex.” For
people whose selection of restroom is never doubted, the “unisex”
seems like a fair accommodation, but essentially, the “unisex” itself
is an instrument of discrimination:
The choice of a third bathroom for a transsexual’s use is
not uncommon, and offers a stark example of what
outsider status is like: if society is composed only of those
who enter the women’s room and those who enter the
men’s room, requiring someone to160use a third bathroom
tells them they are outside society.
West’s act of discrimination was not requiring Goins to use the
unisex restroom but in prohibiting Goins from using the women’s
restroom. West denied Goins the same opportunity that her fellow
employees enjoyed – to belong, without question. For that reason,
requiring Goins to use the “unisex” restroom is not a reasonable
accommodation.
This case is not about the desegregation of public restrooms.
Goins selected the restroom in which she felt most comfortable, the
same criteria her coworkers use. West had never before questioned
that selection process or required every employee to prove their
158. Keller, supra note 83, at 368.
159. See id. at 368-69.
160. Id.; see also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 122-23
(1991) (arguing that incident of unisex bathroom akin to race discrimination).
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biological sex before allowing each employee to use the restroom.
We must assume that no other employee wishing to use the
women’s restroom was asked by West’s counsel to disclose the
appearance or functionality of their genitals. Instead, West
assumed that Goins did not qualify to use the women’s restroom
because Goins refused to answer questions about the appearance of
161
her genitals.
West did not treat Goins differently because her birth
certificate originally designated her “male” or because she had not
yet had sex reassignment surgery. West was unaware of these facts
when it initially formulated its policy. Goins was singled out
because something about her appearance was inconsistent with
someone’s – presumably her coworkers’ or West’s – notion of what
162
“women” means.
This distinction is based on Goins’s inadvertent challenge to a
stereotype. In every sense, that distinction is based squarely on the
criteria set forth in the MHRA: “having or being perceived as
having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with
163
one’s biological maleness or femaleness.” By definition, Julienne
Goins has a self-image that does not conform to the stereotypical
view of male or female. The purpose of anti-discrimination laws is
to prohibit adverse treatment of employees based on
nonconformity. To force Goins to conform to a narrow view of the
categories – “men” and “women” – as defined by someone other
than herself contradicts the very tenets of the MHRA.

161. Many employees, whether transgender or not, would have refused to
participate in such inappropriate discourse between employer and employee.
162. The record does not reveal what qualities about Goins initially created the
red flag causing the coworkers of Goins to initially come forward or what initially
caused West to doubt Goins’s eligibility requirements for using the women’s
restroom.
163. M INN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 41(a) (2000).
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